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The Three Conundrums: Doctrinal, Theoretical, 
and Practical Confusion in the Law of Sexually 
Explicit Speech 
 




In First Amendment law, one rarely disputed notion is that sexually explicit 
speech is less valuable than so-called “core” forms of expression, such as 
political discourse. This study revives that dispute with a focus on the 
Supreme Court’s justifications for categorizing sexually explicit speech as 
“low-value” in the first place. The analysis reveals three conundrums 
plaguing the Court’s jurisprudence: categorizing restrictions on sexually 
explicit speech; interpreting the value and harms of sexually explicit speech; 
and assessing the evidence (or lack thereof) for restrictions on sexually 
explicit speech. This article explains how these conundrums should be 
resolved in sexually explicit speech cases with an emphasis on adopting an 
analytical framework that requires substantiation similar to intermediate 




State and local governments are often described as “laboratories of 
democracy.”1 America’s federal system encourages lawmakers to conduct 
democratic experimentation on economic, political, and social issues, 
 
*Kyla P. Garrett Wagner, Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Communications Law in 
the S.I. Newhouse School of Public Communications at Syracuse University. 
** P. Brooks Fuller, J.D., Ph.D., is an Assistant Professor of Journalism in the Elon 
University School of Communications and Director of the North Carolina Open Government 
Coalition. 
1 See Hannah J. Wiseman & Dave Owen, Federal Laboratories of Democracy, 52 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1119 (2018). Justice Louis Brandeis coined the laboratory metaphor in New 
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, a Fourteenth Amendment due process case involving an Oklahoma 
statute that required companies to obtain a state-issued license to produce and sell ice. 285 
U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“To stay experimentation in things social and 
economic is a grave responsibility. Denial of the right to experiment may be fraught with 
serious consequences to the nation. It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that 
a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).  
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including the regulation of sex and sexually explicit expression. Since the 
early colonial era,2 government officials have taken a keen interest in crafting 
solutions to perceived problems purportedly caused by sexually explicit 
speech. During the last twenty years especially, state and local governments 
have focused legislative experimentation on perceived public health 
problems caused by adult entertainment businesses, producing a mix of 
results in terms of success and sustainability along with some ingenious and 
oddly specific regulatory distillates.3 For example, Los Angeles requires 
adult movie theaters and bookstores to be at least 1,000 feet from one another 
within business districts.4 To prevent nude and semi-nude erotic 
performances, Erie, Pennsylvania, requires female erotic dancers to wear G-
strings over their pubic area and pasties over their nipples.5 The State of 
California proposed mandatory condom use by pornographic film actors 
during the production of sex scenes.6  
These restrictions are grounded in a powerful, if not taken-for-
granted, presumption in First Amendment doctrine that sexually explicit 
speech is less valuable than political, scientific, literary, and ideological 
expression ranging from the ordinary to the extreme. Thus, speakers and 
purveyors of sexually explicit content have limited latitude to “speak” as 
they wish, and the government retains substantial power to experiment with 
regulations that impact these speakers’ discourses about sex. And despite the 
speakers’ efforts to overturn each of the regulations described above on the 
grounds that they violate the First Amendment’s guarantees of freedom of 
speech, courts have repeatedly and resoundingly emphasized that sexually 
 
2 See GEOFFREY R. STONE, SEX AND THE CONSTITUTION: SEX, RELIGION, AND LAW 
FROM AMERICA’S ORIGINS TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2017). 
3 Id. The range of government regulations on sexually explicit speech include search 
and seizure procedures for sexually oriented businesses, censorship and licensure schemes, 
and advertising regulations. 
4 City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
5 City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
6 Vivid Ent., LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 2014) (dismissing Vivid 
Entertainment’s argument that the law was an unconstitutional infringement on pornography 
actors’ and producers’ First Amendment rights). In 2016, a California state initiative known 
as Proposition 60: the California Safer Sex in the Adult Film Industry Act, was put on the 
state ballot for public referendum. The proposition, which was an expansion of a Los Angeles 
County ordinance that passed in 2012, called for mandatory condom use and other barrier-
based safe sex practices by adult film actors during the production of hardcore sex scenes. 
L.A. CTY., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11.39). The statewide proposition ultimately 
failed by a margin of nearly one million votes but remains in effect in Los Angeles. California 
Proposition 60 - Condoms in Pornographic Films Initiative - Results: Rejected, NEW YORK 
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explicit speech is unequivocally low-value.7 But what rationale or evidence, 
if any, justifies these legal conclusions and practical results? In this article, 
we probe that question by analyzing the empirical and logical substance of 
the Supreme Court’s applications of low-value theory to regulations of 
sexually explicit speech.  
American governments have regulated sexually explicit speech for 
centuries,8 but the regulatory schemes like the kind in California and 
Pennsylvania described above first emerged in the 1970s,9 during a period 
when American society’s relationship with sexually explicit speech was 
significantly different than in the 21st century. Popular television programs 
of those days showed married couples sleeping in separate beds,10 and films 
were outlawed for depicting promiscuity and infidelity.11 However, only a 
few generations later, one of the most popular shows on television depicted 
unmarried couples fighting over the last condom,12 and another included a 
plotline in which a pornographic film star ran a legitimate campaign for 
public office.13 Rather than being confined permanently to a seedy blacklist, 
sexual content became considerably more mainstream. Likewise, decades of 
public opinion research repeatedly demonstrates that United States citizens 
show broad support for freedoms of sexually explicit speech, including 
 
7 The Supreme Court has recognized that nearly all regulation on adult entertainment 
is content-based, but that pornography’s low-value justifies the use of intermediate scrutiny 
for the purposes of First Amendment analysis. See Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 448 
(Kennedy, J., concurring). 
8 See Stone, supra note 2.  
9 In 1972, the Supreme Court decided Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., which 
tested the constitutionality of a Detroit zoning ordinance restricting the location of adult 
entertainment businesses. 427 U.S. at 70. The Court recognized that the First Amendment 
affords limited protection to sexually explicit speech and adult businesses, but ultimately 
upheld the regulation. Id.  
10 Michael Asimow, Divorce in the Movies: From the Hays Code to Kramer vs. 
Kramer, 24 LEGAL STUD. F. 221, 235 n.65 (2000); JACK VIZZARD, SEE NO EVIL: LIFE INSIDE 
A HOLLYWOOD CENSOR 114 (1st ed. 1970). 
11 See, e.g., Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961). 
12 In the 1994, NBC aired the popular TV series, Friends, which told the story of six 
friends living and working in New York City. Part of the storyline included the romantic 
relationships of the friends, which included explicit conversations between the characters 
about birth control and condom use. Friends: The One Where Dr. Ramoray Dies (NBC 
television broadcast Mar. 21, 1996). 
13 In 2009, NBC aired the popular TV series, Parks & Recreation, which told the story 
of a local Indiana Parks Department and its employees. A reoccurring character of the series 
was a fictional pornographic film actress, who at one point in the series ran for a seat on the 
local city council. Parks & Recreation: The Debate (NBC television broadcast Apr. 26, 2012). 
Art occasionally imitates life. In June 2020, former pornographic film actor Juan Melecio 
filed to run for a seat on the Wilton Manor commission. Kyle Spinner, Florida porn actor 
running for local office, CBS12.COM (June 10, 2020), https://cbs12.com/news/local/florida-
porn-actor-running-for-local-office.  
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pornography access and use.14 Coupled together, changes in mainstream 
media and strong public support for sexually explicit speech freedom call 
into question a sexually explicit speech jurisprudence based predominantly 
on the notion that sexually explicit speech is low-value.15  
Courts often look to legal history and precedent for answers to 
perceived social problems, but the longstanding First Amendment 
jurisprudence for sexually explicit speech may not reflect current or 
developing social attitudes toward the relative value of sexually explicit 
speech. Alternatively, as regulatory experimentation on sexually explicit 
speech continues, courts may better meet the moment by consulting 
empirical social science. By identifying and unpacking the Court’s low-
value approach to sexually explicit speech, this research sheds light on why 
sexually explicit speech was classified as low-value and proposes a 
framework for how sexually explicit speech (and government regulation of 
sexually explicit speech) should be treated in the future.  
To do this, this article explores Young v. American Mini Theatres, 
Inc.,16 the pivotal case in which the Court first adopted the low-value 
approach to sexually explicit speech. Examination of the Supreme Court’s 
doctrinal move in Young and its “low-value theory” progeny17 revealed three 
pressing conundrums—the categorical, the interpretive, and the 
evidentiary—that have led to doctrinal fractures among the Justices that 
should be resolved. These three conundrums arise from the Court’s struggles 
to categorize restrictions on sexually explicit speech, interpret its value (and 
related harms), and assess relevant empirical evidence in sexually explicit 
 
14 Polls from the 1990s found that sexually explicit speech, specifically speech dealing 
with nudity and sexually suggestive behaviors like nude dancing, is the second most-
supported type of expression, falling just behind political speech and tying with religious 
speech. Julie L. Andsager, A Constant Tension: Public Support for Free Expression, 38 STAN. 
J. INT’L L. 3, 7 (2002). Additionally, recent studies on attitudes towards specific types of 
sexually explicit speech, such as pornography, found citizens’ attitudes toward sexually 
explicit speech are generally positive and that the use of sexually explicit speech is socially 
acceptable. Joseph Price et al., How Much More XXX Is Generation X Consuming? Evidence 
of Changing Attitudes and Behaviors Related to Pornography Since 1973, 53 J. SEX RSCH. 12 
(2016); see also, e.g., Jason S. Carroll et al., Generation XXX: Pornography Acceptance and 
Use Among Emerging Adults, 23 J. ADOLESCENT RSCH. 6 (2008). 
15 Although the First Amendment does not permit total suppression of sexually explicit 
speech, the Supreme Court has stated that sexually explicit speech is considered to have little 
or no social importance and therefore receives little to no First Amendment protection. See 
Young, 427 U.S. at 70 (“Moreover, even though we recognize that the First Amendment will 
not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic value, it 
is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, 
and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire’s 
immortal comment.”). 
16 427 U.S. at 50. 
17 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277; United 
States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).  
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speech cases. Failure to resolve these three conundrums risks further 
muddling a doctrine in desperate need of reformation. Based on these 
findings, we recommend several incremental doctrinal fixes to bring the law 
and protections of sexually explicit speech into harmony with a society that 
values sexually explicit speech considerably more than the law recognizes.  
 
CASE SELECTION & THE RESEARCH 
 
 To be clear, this study focuses on the regulation of protected forms 
of sexual speech and expression,18 referred to herein as “sexually explicit 
speech,” and not unprotected obscenity. From 1957 to 1973, the Supreme 
Court decided a series of cases, mostly related to criminal obscenity 
prosecutions, that laid out the modern framework for distinguishing 
protected sexually explicit speech from unprotected obscenity. Although the 
obscenity cases are relevant because they lay out much of the conceptual 
groundwork for the cases studied here, they are not the focus of the analysis. 
Starting with Roth v. United States19 and blossoming in Miller v. 
California,20 the Supreme Court fashioned a modern obscenity framework 
that manifested in the Miller test.21 Soon after, in 1976, the Court decided 
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,22 which proved to be a pivotal case 
regarding questions of the value and protection of sexually explicit speech.  
Young called into question the constitutionality of zoning laws in 
Detroit, Michigan, that restricted the locations of adult movie theaters. 
Finding the laws constitutional, the Court reasoned that sexually explicit 
speech, such as adult film, is not entirely without First Amendment 
protection, but such speech fails to carry material value worthy of heightened 
 
18 This study does not include cases referring to illegal forms of sexually explicit 
speech. Thus, cases like New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) – the case denying 
protection for sexually explicit speech involving children – that reference to Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., but concern illegal forms of speech were removed to avoid 
muddying the case analysis. 
19354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). The Court established in Roth that obscenity is beyond the 
protection of the First Amendment because this type of speech is without social importance: 
“All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, 
controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the full 
protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area 
of more important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection 
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.” 
20 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
21 Id. at 24. The three-prong obscenity test referred to as the Miller test consists of the 
following: (a) whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’ 
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the 
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by 
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value. 
22 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
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protection, like that of political speech. Specifically, Justice John Paul 
Stevens, writing for the majority, argued, “[I]t is manifest that society’s 
interest in protecting this [sexually explicit] expression is of a wholly 
different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political 
debate….”23 Decades later, the Court’s perception of sexually explicit 
speech has held steadfast through cases involving a variety of sexually 
explicit content, from profane words to nude dancing. 
Young’s significance to sexually explicit speech law guided the case 
selection for this analysis. Following Young, the Supreme Court heard three 
freedom-defining cases for sexually explicit speech—Federal 
Communications Commission (F.C.C.) v. Pacifica Foundation,24 City of Erie 
v. Pap’s A.M.,25 and United States v. Playboy—each of which engaged with 
the Young precedent.26 Each case establishes a significant part of the law on 
sexually explicit speech: Pacifica is the pivotal case in which the Court 
affirmed the F.C.C.’s power to regulate indecent content in broadcast media 
during daytime hours when children may be in the audience; Pap’s A.M. 
affirmed that although nude dancing is a protected form of free expression, 
it is subject to regulation even when the regulation interferes with the speech; 
and Playboy reinforced the exceptions and protections of adults to access 
sexually explicit content on cable channels.  
The Young progeny helped cement the protections and restrictions 
on sexually explicit speech. In each case, the Court reaffirmed that sexually 
explicit speech is low-value. It is this low-value status that this research aims 
to better understand. This study is not the first to explore and question 
whether sexually explicit speech is low-value, but it does sharpen the focus 
to the line of cases stemming from Young. Broadly, legal scholars have 
analyzed many of these same cases to argue that the value of sexually explicit 
speech often depends heavily on its surrounding context, such as the medium 
of expression and the genre (e.g. political commentary, humor, or non-
educational content).27 For example, Christopher Schultz elegantly observed 
that the value of sexually explicit speech is fluid and can “float” between 
levels of protection depending on its context.28 But amid these studies on 
sexually explicit speech, a discussion of the Court’s underlying justifications 
(if any) for the low-value approach to sexually explicit speech is glaringly 
absent. Thus, this research aims to fill this gap by interrogating the legal, 
 
23 Id. at 70-71. 
24 Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726. 
25 City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277. 
26 Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803. 
27 Christopher M. Schultz, Content-Based Restrictions on Free Expression: 
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theoretical, practical, and empirical justifications that have built the doctrine 
of sexually explicit speech.  
 
THE THREE CONUNDRUMS 
 
Three analytical conundrums characterize the cases reviewed in this 
study. The first, the categorical conundrum, entails the Court’s struggle to 
categorize restrictions on sexually explicit expression for First Amendment 
analysis purposes. The second, the interpretive conundrum, involves the 
Court’s struggle to clearly articulate the communicative values and social 
harms related to sexually explicit expression. The third, the evidentiary 
conundrum, focuses on the Court’s inconsistent approach to the nature and 
amount of evidence required to sustain such restrictions. Together, these 
conundrums cause fracture among the justices and create muddled doctrine 
in need of reformation in light of existing and nascent social science related 
to the public’s attitudes toward sexually explicit speech.  
 
THE CATEGORICAL CONUNDRUM 
 
 The most obvious point of fracture is how the justices choose to 
categorize incursions on the protected, though purportedly low-value, First 
Amendment activities involved in sexually explicit speech cases. Each of the 
focal cases, including Young v. American Mini Theatres and its three 
progeny cases analyzed here, involved some dispute over whether the 
regulations of sexually explicit speech were content-based regulations 
requiring heightened constitutional scrutiny or content-neutral regulations 
deserving of less exacting, intermediate scrutiny. The case law on sexually 
explicit expression is dominated by this doctrinally critical categorical 
conundrum.  
The following section explores the Court’s efforts to resolve this 
categorical conundrum and the implications of its failure to render a coherent 
doctrinal position on laws that explicitly target protected sexually explicit 
expression and adult businesses. How the Court resolves this conundrum, if 
it chooses to revisit any of its landmark cases,29 could portend upheaval in 
the First Amendment landscape underlying sexually explicit speech. 
Additionally, if the Court were to extend its reasoning from paradigm-
shifting cases such as Reed v. Town of Gilbert,30 which raised critical First 
 
29 See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 567 U.S. 239, 259 (2012) (Ginsburg, J., 
concurring) (“In my view, the Court’s decision in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation was wrong 
when it issued. Time, technological advances, and the Commission’s untenable rulings in the 
cases now before the Court show why Pacifica bears reconsideration.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
30 576 U.S. 155 (2015). 
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Amendment categorization issues, then the doctrine of sexually explicit 
speech could be primed for renaissance and reimagination. 
 
Every restriction of sexually explicit speech is content-based 
 
The First Amendment is not content-agnostic. As other scholars 
have discussed capably, a system of First Amendment protection constructed 
hierarchically necessarily invites the Court to separate protected content 
from unprotected content.31 As the Court stated clearly in Young v. American 
Mini Theatres, “[t]he question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the 
First Amendment often depends on the content of the speech.”32 In that 
sense, every restriction on expression must take into account the content 
restricted. However, the government may not restrict protected expression 
when the primary motivation for the restriction is that the government 
disfavors the communicative content. Unpopular speech must be given 
breathing space. In Young, however, the Court sanctioned a local 
government’s efforts to channel a broad category of disfavored expression 
(adult films) into particular geographical areas. As the theater operators in 
Young argued, the restrictions foisted financial burdens on them solely 
because of the content of the films they showed. The majority in Young 
categorized the zoning regulations as time, place, or manner regulations 
because they did not clearly disfavor a particular political or social viewpoint 
within the adult film genre. If the regulation had applied only to adult theaters 
showing pornography that ridiculed then-President Gerald Ford, then the 
Court likely would have analyzed the restriction as content-based. Instead, 
the Court permitted the regulation of an entire sector of business on the basis 
of content using the doctrinal maneuver of content-neutrality.  
This pattern emerged in all of the cases analyzed in this study. For 
example, in FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, the Court searched the record 
unsuccessfully for evidence that federal regulators had penalized the Pacifica 
Foundation because of the political or social message underlying George 
Carlin’s use of vulgar language.33 Without such evidence, the regulation of 
non-obscene, indecent expression was allowed to stand. The Court has 
permitted more sweeping regulations of large swaths of content purportedly 
done for content-neutral purposes such as protecting property values and 
minimizing crime.34 In doing so, the Court has fashioned a gargantuan 
exemption to protection for sexually explicit speech that would be 
inconceivable in the realms of political or commercial speech.  
 
31 See, e.g., Genevieve Lakier, The Invention of Low-Value Speech, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
1 (2015). 
32 Young, 427 U.S. at 66. 
33 Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 746. 
34 City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277. 
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City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. represents the most striking instance of 
the Court’s application of the content-neutral O’Brien standard to a 
regulation aimed to restrict sexual content. The decision also hangs on a 
precarious evidentiary record, which will be discussed later in this article. 
Whereas Young v. American Mini Theatres involved a regulation that 
prohibited two adult film establishments within 1,000 feet of one another, 
City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. categorically prohibited public nudity in public 
places, including businesses of public accommodation.35 Although “being in 
a state of nudity is not an inherently expressive condition,” the Court 
nevertheless affirmed that “nude dancing of the type at issue [in City of Erie] 
is expressive conduct, although we think that it falls only within the outer 
ambit of the First Amendment’s protection.”36 Although the Court did not 
define the contours of that outer ambit, it clearly brought nude dancing 
within the First Amendment’s protective reach insofar as the dancing took 
place inside a private or quasi-private place and not openly in public space.  
But lawmakers in Erie, Pennsylvania, harbored no tolerance for nude 
dancing, banning it outright and in a manner that punished only adult nude 
dancing and left untouched supposedly highbrow theater. Indeed, legal 
counsel for the City of Erie admitted in an earlier proceeding that the ban on 
public nudity would not apply to stage productions of “Equus” or “Hair,” 
both of which are stage plays involving full nudity.37 The city had clearly 
identified a disfavored form of nude expressive conduct, erotic dancing, and 
targeted it under a more sweeping, though facially neutral, public nudity 
ordinance.  
The categorical conundrum manifested in the Pap’s A.M.’s 
plurality’s use of the O’Brien test for expressive conduct as the dominant 
analytical framework. In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the regulation 
ultimately worked a total ban, not an incidental burden on speech, rendering 
O’Brien inappropriate:  
 
If one assumes that the same erotic message is conveyed by nude 
dancers as by those wearing miniscule costumes, one means of 
expressing that message is banned; if one assumes that the 
messages are different, one of those messages is banned. In either 
event, the ordinance is a total ban.38 
 
 Justice Stevens went on to suggest that the Court’s use of secondary effects 
justifications for limiting speech were only constitutionally tenable in 
 
35 Id. at 282-83. 
36 Id. at 289. 
37 Id. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
38 Id. at 319 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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circumstances where the market for such speech could survive.39 This was 
plainly not the case under Erie’s total ban on nude dancing. It was on this 
basis that the dissenting justices in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. urged their 
brethren to strike down the ordinance, arguing that the government bore the 
burden of proving a higher-order government interest and narrow tailoring 
given Erie’s “near obsessive preoccupation with a single target of the law,” 
nude dancing.40  
Young v. American Mini Theatres looms large in City of Erie v. 
Pap’s A.M. The plurality maintained that whatever illicit motive lawmakers 
used to craft the public nudity ban, O’Brien required the Court to look only 
at the constitutionality of the statute as written.41 All that Erie lawmakers had 
to show was a reasonable belief that the same secondary effects that 
threatened Detroit, the city whose ordinance was at issue in Young, would 
threaten Erie. Despite many indications that the City of Erie had singled out 
the adult establishment, Kandyland, because of its erotic messaging, the 
Court concluded that the matter was properly resolved as a content-neutral, 
secondary effects case. The Court did not require the City of Erie to make a 
stronger showing that the ordinance was necessary to directly or materially 
advance a more compelling government interest than what is required under 
intermediate scrutiny. 
The existing case law on sexually explicit speech presents a 
seemingly intractable categorization problem. Many of the regulations of 
sexually oriented businesses are glaringly and often admittedly, based on 
content or the identity of the speaker. In other contexts and for other speech 
types, the Supreme Court habitually condemns such regulations by analyzing 
them against a rigorous, “fatal in fact” standard of strict constitutional 
scrutiny.42 However, in the context of sexually oriented businesses, the Court 
has sanctioned the use of the content-neutral O’Brien test, a much less 
exacting standard, even when the record contains evidence that lawmakers 
specifically targeted disfavored speakers on the basis of the content they 
purvey, which Justice Stevens’ dissent clearly opposes in City of Erie v. 
Pap’s A.M. 43 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Reed v. Town of Gilbert44 calls into 
question the viability of the regulatory scheme upheld in City of Erie v. Pap’s 
A.M. Although Reed v. Town of Gilbert did not involve sexually explicit 
speech, it represents a paradigm shift in the Court’s approach to identifying 
 
39 Id. at 319-20. 
40 Id. at 330. 
41 Id. at 292. 
42 Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: 
A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).  
43 City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 328 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
44 Reed, 576 U.S. 155. 
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content-based restrictions and contributes an additional layer of uncertainty 
to the existing categorical conundrum. Reed is an important departure from 
the cases discussed here insofar as it makes clear that content-based 
restrictions presumptively target expression on the basis of its 
communicative content.45 Implicit here is that if a court classifies a 
regulation as content-based, then that means the regulation necessarily 
targets communication. This is a significant shift from the central lessons of 
Young and its progeny. As we discussed above, the dominant paradigm 
arising out of Young holds that some content-based restrictions regulate 
communication whereas others regulate the effects of communication, 
placing secondary effects regulations on different (and more government-
friendly) constitutional footing. Reed is far less equivocal. Writing for the 
majority in Reed, Justice Clarence Thomas stated that a content-based 
restriction, subject to strict scrutiny, applies to protected communication 
because of the “topic discussed or the idea or the message expressed.”46  
Considering the Court’s reasoning in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. and 
taking the Court in Pap’s A.M. at its word, an erotic message likely qualifies 
as a topic and its non-obscene depiction qualifies as expression. Therefore, 
the holding in Reed presents one possible avenue for extending fuller First 
Amendment protection to sexually explicit speech that is targeted on the 
basis of its sexual subject matter. At a minimum, Reed suggests that the 
Court has not resolved the categorical conundrum the runs through the case 
law on sexually explicit speech. If anything, it has further complicated the 
doctrine. 
 
THE INTERPRETIVE CONUNDRUM – FINDING THE MESSAGE IN SEXUALLY 
EXPLICIT SPEECH 
 
 Although the Justices roundly agree that sexually explicit speech 
deserves some modicum of First Amendment protection47—it is impossible 
to quantify how much or qualify what kind—the majority opinions vacillate 
between theoretical justifications for protection. From time to time, the 
Justices have invoked the marketplace of ideas, an external, consequentialist 
theoretical framework concerned with speech’s contributions to public 
discourse. At others, autonomy (or self-fulfillment) theory has characterized 
the majority position. These opinions call on us to examine how the Court 
applies a value structure to the unfamiliar. 
 
45Id. at 161 (“Content-based laws—those that target speech based on its 
communicative content—are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the 
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests.”).  
46 Id. 
47 See, e.g., Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 743; City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 285. 
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The interpretative conundrum surrounding speech’s value is 
especially dynamic. The Supreme Court’s collective difficulty with 
confronting social and technological change has been taunted occasionally.48 
Memoirs tell of Supreme Court justices, popcorn in hand, awkwardly 
watching the pornographic films to prepare for oral argument on docketed 
obscenity cases.49 Although sometimes comical, one oft-repeated concern is 
that the members of the Court struggle to understand unfamiliar technologies 
and texts. In the case law on sexually explicit speech, this struggle manifests 
as an interpretive conundrum that feeds directly back into the Court’s 
discussion of the value of sexually explicit speech. In the cases examined for 
this study, the Court routinely struggles to articulate in explicit terms the 
communicative value of erotic texts or sexually expressive conduct, yet in 
many cases, the justices have no trouble concluding that such texts lie at the 
periphery of First Amendment protection. The resulting case law exhibits a 
dearth of critical engagement on the meaning of sexually explicit texts. 
 
A very brief history of the regulation of sexually explicit speech  
 
The most significant starting point for U.S. law on sexual expression 
is Roth v. United States,50 a 1957 case in which the Supreme Court laid out 
its first modern test for unprotected obscene speech. In Roth, a bookseller 
was prosecuted for using the postal service to sell and distribute allegedly 
obscene, sexually explicit materials in violation of federal law.51 The 
bookseller, Samuel Roth, argued that the law violated his First Amendment 
right to free expression, but the Court unsurprisingly upheld his conviction 
because obscenity is “not within the area of constitutionally protected speech 
or press,” meaning the government could regulate it freely.52 Further, the 
Roth majority announced a rough standard of obscenity: “whether to the 
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.”53  
 
48 See, e.g., Trevor Timm, Technology Law Will Soon be Reshaped by People Who 
Don’t Use Email, THE GUARDIAN (May 3, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/may/03/technology-law-us-supreme-
court-internet-nsa. 
49See, e.g., BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE 
SUPREME COURT (1979); TED CRUZ, A TIME FOR TRUTH: REIGNITING THE PROMISE OF AMERICA 
(2015). 
50 Roth, 354 U.S. 476. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 485.  
53 Id. at 489.  
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The Roth standard held for only a decade until the Supreme Court 
decided Memoirs v. Massachusetts.54 In Memoirs, the Massachusetts 
government argued that John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure, a 
novel published in 1748 that detailed the life of an English sex worker, was 
legally obscene.55 The Court determined the book, despite any offensiveness, 
was not obscene because it was not “utterly without redeeming social 
value.”56 In Memoirs, the Court clarified the Roth standard with a three-
prong test that must “coalesce” for speech to be obscene: (a) the dominant 
theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex; 
(b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary 
community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual 
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.57 Most 
importantly, the Court explained that for speech to be obscene it must be 
entirely without value; even speech with only a “modicum of social value” 
was worthy of protection.58 The Memoirs standard was a win for free speech 
advocates because it required the utter absence of value to strip a work of 
First Amendment protection. In the decade following Memoirs, the Court 
decided nearly 45 obscenity cases without sustaining an obscenity 
conviction.  
But changes to the composition of the Court near the end of the 
1960s brought monumental changes in the law of sexual expression. In June 
1973, the Court handed down three doctrine-shifting opinions: Miller v. 
California,59 Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,60 and Kaplan v. California.61 
Miller involved the prosecution of mailing obscene advertisements;62 Paris 
Adult Theater I reviewed the powers of a local government to enjoin an adult 
movie theater from showing allegedly obscene films to consenting adults;63 
and Kaplan concerned the conviction of an adult bookstore proprietor for 
selling a “plain-covered” but sexually explicit book.64 In these opinions, the 
Court ruled on an array of issues related to states’ ability to enjoin the 
distribution of obscene sexual expression, including the now-prevailing 
Miller obscenity test, which asks: (a) whether ‘the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a 
 
54 A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Att’y Gen. 
of Com. of Mass., 383 U.S. 413 (1966). 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 420.  
57 Id. at 418. 
58 Id. at 420-21.  
59 Miller, 413 U.S. 15. 
60 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). 
61 Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973).  
62 Miller, 413 U.S. 15. 
63 Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49.  
64 Kaplan, 413 U.S. 115.  
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whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or 
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined 
by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks 
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.65  
But when the Miller test was established, individual parts of the test 
remained undefined, which required the Court to clarify the test in 
subsequent cases. For example, in Jenkins v. Georgia, which involved an 
obscenity conviction of a Georgia theater manager for showing the film 
“Carnal Knowledge,” the Court clarified that “patently offensive” must 
“depict or describe patently offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct,”66 such as 
“representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or perverted, 
actual or simulated,” or “representations or descriptions of masturbation, 
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.”67 However, the 
value question under Miller remained governed by somewhat amorphous 
national standards rather than a discrete community standard.68 Collectively, 
these cases defined the speech-restrictive aspects of Miller but failed to 
provide clarity about its redemptive value prong, which made for an 
especially restrictive First Amendment doctrine.  
 
Context and media: some problems in the post-Miller landscape 
 
Since Miller, the Supreme Court has heard many cases involving 
sexually explicit speech, addressing challenges to search and seizure 
procedures,69 censorship schemes,70 licensing schemes,71 advertising 
regulations,72 jury instructions,73 and protections for specific types of 
 
65 Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.  
66 Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 160 (1974).  
67 Id. 
68 Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497 (1987). 
69 See, e.g., Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46, 63 (1989). The Court 
established that materials challenged as obscene cannot be seized and removed from 
circulation until officially found obscene, “While a single copy of a book or film may be 
seized and retained for evidentiary purposes based on a finding of probable cause, the 
publication may not be taken out of circulation completely until there has been a 
determination of obscenity after an adversary hearing.” Id. 
70 See, e.g., Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). From the 1950s to the 1980s, 
it was common for local governments to use censorship systems, like prior review of movies, 
to screen for obscene content, but the Court ruled that such systems had to include safeguards, 
such as prompt judicial review, to prevent unfair censorship.  
71 See, e.g., FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990).  
72 See, e.g., Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966). The Court established 
that the ways in which sexual but non-obscene content is advertised, such as exploiting the 
material for its sexual content, can lead the material to qualify as obscene.  
73 See, e.g., Pope, 481 U.S. 497. There was confusion in the lower courts about the 
instructions to juries on how to apply the three prongs of the Miller test for obscenity. In Pope, 
the Court held that, while the first two prongs of the Miller test may be determined based on 
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sexually explicit speech such as nude dancing.74 In each of these cases, the 
Court recognized that perceptions of sexually explicit speech vary by context 
and community.75 As a result, the Court never committed to a single 
definition of “pornographic” or “indecent.”  
The protection for sexually explicit speech depends on a variety of 
factors, such as the audience viewing the speech,76 the medium through 
which the speech is accessed,77 the physical space in which the speech is 
accessed,78 the state interests for regulating the speech,79 and, of course, the 
speech itself.80 Legal researchers have written extensively on how protection 
for sexually explicit speech depends heavily on contextual factors. For 
example, Milagros Rivera-Sanchez examined the FCC’s dismissed 
 
contemporary community standards, the third prong must be determined based on whether a 
reasonable person would find value in the material. Id. at 500.  
74 Sexually explicit speech takes many different forms, and the Court has addressed a 
variety of forms of such speech. City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277 (analyzing restrictions on nude 
dancing); Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (analyzing restrictions on live 
adult entertainment); Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (analyzing restrictions on adult-
oriented cable channels); Sable Commc’ns of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) 
(analyzing regulations on dial-a-porn/phone sex services). 
75 The Court determined that obscenity (Miller, 413 U.S. 15), child pornography 
(Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990)), and indecent content on broadcast during daytime 
programming (FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)) are unprotected by the First 
Amendment.  
76 The Court was most concerned about protecting minors from exposure to sexually 
explicit speech. See, e.g., United States v. Am. Library Assoc., Inc., 539 U.S. 194 (2003); 
Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986); 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726; Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).  
77 The Supreme Court has “long recognized that each medium of expression presents 
special First Amendment problems,” Se. Promotions, Ltd., 420 U.S. at 557 (citing Red Lion 
Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) and Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 
(1952)). 
78 Sexually explicit speech, both obscene and non-obscene, is legal in the privacy of 
one’s home: “[i]f the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business 
telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may 
watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power 
to control men’s minds.” Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969). But sexually explicit 
speech may be regulated or outlawed when accessed in public. See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 
U.S. 49. 
79 State interests in regulating sexually explicit speech include protecting vulnerable 
audiences, like minors (Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, protecting social order and morale 
(Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998); Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 204 (1975); Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. 49), and preventing the 
secondary effects of sexually explicit speech, such as increased crime and decreased property 
values (Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 425; City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277; Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 
(1986); Young, 427 U.S. 50). 
80 The Court determined that obscenity (Roth, 354 U.S. 476), child pornography 
(Ferber, 458 U.S. 747), and indecent content on broadcast during daytime programming 
(Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 were unprotected by the First Amendment). 
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indecency complaints and determined that the communicative context of 
sexually explicit speech is especially crucial to its protection on broadcast 
media.81 According to Rivera-Sanchez, sexually explicit speech in a 
humorous or non-educational programming context is more likely to be 
penalized by the FCC than sexually explicit speech used in purely 
educational, non-entertainment contexts.82 Similarly, Stephen Sher 
determined the purpose of sexually explicit speech drives its level of 
protection. Analyzing the decency provisions put in place by the National 
Endowment for the Arts (NEA), Sher revealed that the Court gives variable 
protection to speech that lies on the border between artistic indecent speech 
and non-artistic indecent speech (i.e., pornography), with more protection 
given to speech that is believed to have artistic merit, like nude dancing.83 
Finally, researcher David Cole determined that the protection for sexually 
explicit speech depends greatly on its social acceptability over time rather 
than specific material aspects of the expression in a given moment. The 
Court is often concerned that sexually explicit speech brings private behavior 
into the public sphere. 84 Cole argues that society represses speakers “who 
challenge the public/private line by making public sexual matters that the 
majority would prefer remained private.”85 This creates a system in which 
protection for sexually explicit speech depends on how much the speech 
violates deeply engrained social standards of decency and how much the 
speech breaks the spheres of public and private behavior.86  
Across a wide array of contexts and content, the Court consistently 
classifies sexually explicit speech according to its lesser quantum of social 
value.87 It expresses this concept linearly: the more speech is perceived as 
aiding in social progress or promoting the exchange of ideas, the more 
 
81 Milagros Rivera-Sanchez, How Far Is Too Far? The Line Between “Offensive” and 
“Indecent” Speech, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 327, 328 (1997). 
82 Id. at 328. 
83 Stephen N. Sher, The Identical Treatment of Obscene and Indecent Speech: The 
1991 NEA Appropriations Act, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1107, 1131-32 (1991).  
84 David Cole, Playing by Pornography’s Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 
143 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 115 (1994). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. at 131. 
87 See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). In 
Chaplinsky, the Court upheld the conviction of a Jehovah’s Witness who was charged with 
breaching the peace, stating, “There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of 
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any 
Constitutional problem. These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and 
the insulting or ‘fighting’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to 
incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well observed that such utterances are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth 
that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality.” (internal citations omitted). Chaplinsky remains good law that guides the 
hierarchical or low-value approach. 
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valuable speech is perceived to be. But is this distinction based on anything 
real? As a social fact, is sexually explicit speech really low-value? And if so, 
what justifications and decisions do the Supreme Court make to reach such 
a significant conclusion? In the near half-century since the United States 
Supreme Court decided Miller v. California, the U.S. experienced a digital 
revolution that changed the availability of information and media and a 
political revolution that challenged social norms around love, marriage, and 
sex.88 With those revolutions came changes to the landscape of sexually 
explicit speech. The number of web pages containing sexually explicit media 
reaches into the millions,89 entire radio and podcast channels are dedicated 
to answering questions about sex and relationships,90 and mainstream 
entertainment depicts actors discussing sexual issues, such as sexually 
transmitted diseases and pornography use.91 Despite this progress, the 
doctrine related to sexually explicit speech has remained relatively stable;  
sexually explicit speech receives minimal First Amendment protection and 
it is still perceived as low-value.92 But seldom have courts, including the 
Supreme Court, explicitly discussed the relative value of sexually explicit 
speech compared to core protected speech under the First Amendment. The 
snapshot of cases from Young v. American Mini Theatres to City of Erie v. 
Pap’s A.M. provides a window into this harm-value conundrum related to 
sexually explicit speech. 
 
Sexually explicit speech and theories of value 
 
 Broadly, the case analysis reveals a clear split in how the justices 
articulate whether and to what extent sexually explicit speech, which falls at 
the borderlines of constitutional protection, retains value for First 
Amendment purposes. Starting in Young v. American Mini Theatres, the 
justices diverged dramatically in the theoretical frameworks applied to the 
conundrum of sexually explicit speech. Justices amenable to robust 
 
88 See, e.g., Barry Leiner et al., A brief history of the Internet, 39 ACM SIGCOMM 
COMPUT. COMM. REV. 22 (2009).  
89 See OGI OGAS & SAI GADDAM, A BILLION WICKED THOUGHTS: WHAT THE WORLD’S 
LARGEST EXPERIMENT REVEALS ABOUT HUMAN DESIRE (2011); see also Pornhub, 10 Years of 
Pleasure and Data, Pornhub (last visited April 15, 2018), 
https://www.pornhub.com/event/10years.  
90 Ellen Huerta, The 10 Most Intimate Podcasts About Love and Sex, HUFFINGTON 
POST (Feb. 26, 2016), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/ellen-huerta/the-10-most-intimate-
podcasts-about-love-and-sex_b_9310214.html.  
91 Television shows like Friends and Girls are known for their explicit discussions on 
sexual issues like condom use and effectiveness (Friends: The One Where Dr. Ramoray Dies, 
(NBC television broadcast March 21, 1996)); pornography use, sexual diseases, and abortion 
(Girls: Close-Up, (HBO cable television Feb. 22, 2015)). 
92 See Vivid Ent., LLC, 774 F.3d 566. 
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regulation of sexually explicit speech employed the rhetoric and theory of 
the marketplace of ideas framework. They posited that sexually explicit 
speech is unrelated to the communication of ideas or beliefs. Yet, as 
discussed earlier, the justices neither fully explain the logic behind that 
conclusion, nor do they entertain the possibility that the market has rendered 
a value judgment in favor of sexual content. On the other hand, justices 
predisposed to protecting sexually explicit speech gravitate toward 
autonomy-based justifications for limiting the government’s attempts to 
stifle it.  
 Young v. American Mini Theatres perfectly captures the dialogue of the 
Court’s interpretive conundrum. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the 
majority in Young argued, “[T]here is surely a less vital interest in the 
uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between 
pornography and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas 
of social and political significance.”93 Perhaps unintentionally, the Court 
sanctioned the belief that adult film is not operating the marketplace of social 
and political ideas. It relegated so-called “borderline” speech, unabashedly 
on the basis of its content and the identity of the speakers, into specific 
government-regulated physical spaces.94 As discussed above, the majority 
did not shy away from the fact that this is a content-based regulation. It 
claimed instead that this sort of content-based regulation for borderline 
speech poses less of a free speech problem than a regulation aimed at a more 
obvious exposition of ideas.  
According to the Court, one of the chief justifications for upholding 
the zoning laws at issue in Young v. American Mini Theatres is the 
assumption that protected sexually explicit speech categorically lacks 
societal importance: 
 
Moreover, even though we recognize that the First Amendment 
will not tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have 
some arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest 
in protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and 
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political debate 
that inspired Voltaire’s immortal comment. Whether political 
oratory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to 
despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our 
duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us 
would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the 
citizen’s right to see “Specified Sexual Activities” exhibited in the 
theaters of our choice. Even though the First Amendment protects 
communication in this area from total suppression, we hold that 
 
93 Young, 427 U.S. at 61. 
94 Id. at 63. 
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the State may legitimately use the content of these materials as the 
basis for placing them in a different classification from other 
motion pictures.95  
 
However, the Court made this determination without inspecting the works in 
question or the role that adult film theaters might play in how adults engage 
with ideas on the subjects of sex and sexuality. In Justice Stevens’s view, the 
Court can make this constitutional maneuver because the “market for 
[pornography] is essentially unrestrained.”96 According to the majority, if the 
ordinance in Young had been more expressly focused on specific viewpoints 
expressed in certain adult films and not on channeling an entire category of 
speech into particular physical spaces, this may have posed an 
insurmountable constitutional problem. 97 
 The interpretive conundrum seemed to blossom in FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation, a landmark case in which Justice Stevens, the author of the 
majority opinion in Young, argued that George Carlin’s famous “Filthy 
Words” monologue fell outside the scope of full First Amendment protection 
when communicated via broadcast technology. Justice Stevens asserted, 
“While some of these references may be protected, they surely lie at the 
periphery of First Amendment concern.”98 However, he never explained 
why. 
At this point, the Court’s conclusory reasoning is not especially 
notable. But what is notable is how Justice Stevens framed the First 
Amendment question. He wrote, “If there were any reason to believe that the 
Commission’s characterization of the Carlin monologue as offensive could 
be traced to its political content—or even to the fact that it satirized 
contemporary attitudes about four-letter words—First Amendment 
protection might be required. But that is simply not this case.”99 This asks 
whether the speaker-claimant in a First Amendment challenge can prove that 
the government has targeted an ideological, and thus presumptively valuable, 
message or merely targeted the message’s offensiveness. Justice Stevens’s 
opinion in Pacifica, built upon the foundation cemented in Young, leaves 
courts today with an intractable circularity problem. If a court must discern 
whether the government is targeting offensiveness, it must first interpret both 
the speaker’s message and the government’s response. This necessarily 
injects the jurist’s subjective interpretation into what is intended to be an 
objective exercise in First Amendment categorization. This, the majority in 
Cohen v. California ruled, the government may not do, recognizing the risks 
 
95 Id. at 70-71. 
96 Id. at 62. 
97 Id. at 70. 
98Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 743. 
99 Id. at 746.  
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of leaving interpretive power in the hands of government actors.100 Justice 
Lewis F. Powell echoed that sentiment in his concurrence in Pacifica, which 
highlighted his disagreement with Justice Stevens’s approach dating back to 
Young:  
 
I do not subscribe to the theory that the Justices of this Court are 
free generally to decide on the basis of its content which speech 
protected by the First Amendment is most ‘valuable’ and hence 
deserving of the most protection, and which is less ‘valuable’ and 
hence deserving of less protection.101  
 
Indeed, as fans and scholars of Carlin’s work have noted, the social value of 
Carlin’s commentary on linguistic taboos was inextricably tied to its 
offensiveness and the listener’s subsequent grappling with it.102  
 Powell’s concurrence in Pacifica provided powerful, though ultimately 
unsuccessful, support for a First Amendment theory of value rooted in 
listener autonomy. As the Court continued to grapple with cases involving 
sexually explicit speech, this theoretical framework appeared to secure some 
semblance of a foothold as the pure marketplace of ideas metaphor faded in 
these few cases. In United States v. Playboy, the penultimate case in the 
Young lineage, the Court embraced autonomy theory more forcefully. United 
States v. Playboy involved a First Amendment challenge to FCC regulations 
requiring cable companies delivering adult material to scramble their signal 
to prevent non-subscribing households from receiving any sound or images 
of adult content through “signal bleed” into other cable channels.103  
The Court struck down the regulatory scheme on First Amendment 
grounds, holding that it could not survive strict constitutional scrutiny 
required for content-based regulations of speech carried over privately built 
and operated technological infrastructure.104 Justice Anthony Kennedy’s 
majority opinion embraced the individual autonomy justification for limiting 
government control over cable content:  
 
The Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, 
including esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature, 
can be formed, tested, and expressed. What the Constitution says 
is that these judgments are for the individual to make, not for the 
 
100 Cohen v. California., 403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
101 Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring) (citing Young, 427 U.S. 
at 63–73).  
102 Richard G. Passler, Regulation of Indecent Radio Broadcasts: George Carlin 
Revisited – What Does the Future Hold for the Seven Dirty Words?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 131, 
(1990). 
103 Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. at 808. 
104 Id. at 818. 
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Government to decree, even with the mandate or approval of a 
majority. Technology expands the capacity to choose; and it 
denies the potential of this revolution if we assume the 
Government is best positioned to make these choices for us.105 
 
The only mention of markets involved the Court’s discussion of the efficacy 
of various market-based solutions for cable companies to prevent delivery of 
potentially offensive content to users who might be so offended. “The 
citizen,” Justice Kennedy argued, “is entitled to seek out or reject certain 
ideas or influences without Government interference or control.”106 For 
Justice Kennedy, the citizen and not the market took primacy. 
Although United States v. Playboy seemed to indicate full-throated 
support for the proposition that the government may not single out private 
businesses trafficking in adult material, the Court reversed course in the same 
term in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. The Pap’s A.M. case involved a First 
Amendment challenge to a ban on public nudity brought by an adult 
nightclub that featured fully nude dancing for entertainment on its 
premises.107 The Court ultimately ruled that the regulation passed First 
Amendment scrutiny because it amounted to a constitutional limitation on 
expressive conduct that was unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression.108 The Court in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. relied heavily on 
Justice Stevens’s conclusory dicta in Young v. American Mini Theatres: 
 
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not 
tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some 
arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest in 
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and 
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political 
debate.109 
 
Interestingly, Justice Stevens dissented in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., not 
because of any epiphany that adult entertainment possessed more 
constitutional value than he acknowledged in Young, but because he 
considered the total ban on a form of erotic message to be an unconstitutional 
government overstep in the way that using zoning law to cluster or channel 
expressive businesses was not. 110 
 
105 Id.  
106 Id. at 817. 
107 City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 282-83. 
108 Id. at 285. 
109 Young, 427 U.S. at 70. 
110 See City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 319 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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The legacy of Justice Stevens’s opinion in Young is that the 
government is given broad authority to foist regulatory burdens on adult 
content that jurists consider less valuable so long as it does not ban the speech 
entirely. The prevailing theory, despite some backlash, is that the market will 
respond to protect adult content if it is indeed valuable. The case law, 
however, has built in several powerful predeterminations of value and 
marketability despite pushback from jurists like Justice Powell and Justice 
Kennedy who raised concerns about encroachments on citizen autonomy in 
the mutual exchange of ideas. Thus continues a classic First Amendment 
conundrum: How, if at all, can the Supreme Court adopt an appropriate 
theoretical framework for value without tainting its own rulings with the 
interpretive gloss of the individual justices who rotate through the chambers? 
The most likely answer is that the Court cannot promise that. Fortunately, 
the Court has an available path toward resolving both the categorical 
conundrum and the interpretive conundrum if it can resolve a key evidentiary 
conundrum. 
 
THE EVIDENTIARY CONUNDRUM 
 
 In Roth v. United States, the Court stated, “The protection given 
speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for 
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people.”111 
If we take the Court at its word, then the doctrine of sexually explicit speech 
must give substantial weight to citizens’ preferences for borderline speech. 
The challenge in this area has been adequately capturing both the core 
purpose of the First Amendment and the diversity of ways that sexually 
explicit speech promotes potentially unpopular social ideas112 with differing 
levels of abstraction and sometimes through various forms of expressive 
conduct.  
Unsurprisingly, the Court has not given much explicit guidance on 
whether or how it will use empirical evidence to answer First Amendment 
questions. The Supreme Court is not, at least explicitly, a factfinding body. 
It seldom reconsiders factual circumstances or it does not explicitly weigh 
the probative value of evidence in the cases it hears. In rare cases involving 
 
111 Roth, 354 U.S. at 484. 
112 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 191 (1964) (stating, “[w]e would reiterate, 
however, our recognition in Roth that obscenity is excluded from the constitutional protection 
only because it is ‘utterly without redeeming social importance,’ and that ‘[t]he portrayal of 
sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient  reason to deny material 
the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press.’[ ] It follows that material 
dealing with sex in a manner that advocates ideas, or that has literary or scientific or artistic 
value or any other form of social importance, may not be branded as obscenity and denied the 
constitutional protection.”). 
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serious implications for social institutions such as marriage,113 
employment,114 and voting,115 the Court has been willing to engage with 
empirical evidence. However, the cases examined here reflect a profound 
reluctance among the majority of the justices during the period studied to 
second-guess lower courts’ factual determinations arising out of empirical 
studies. What is especially troubling about the Court’s deference to 
lawmakers is that in several of these key cases, the record reveals glaring 
instances of unfounded assumptions of third-party harm that clearly burden 
certain content and certain speakers without empirical justification.  
 
Judicial deference and empirical evidence 
 
The Court’s application of the secondary effects doctrine in Young 
v. American Mini Theatres rested on evidence from sociologists, urban 
planners, and unidentified laypersons who predicted that concentrations of 
adult establishments would lead to the erosion of Detroit’s economic 
vitality.116 The Detroit Common Council found that adult establishments, 
“because of their very nature, are recognized as having serious objectionable 
operational characteristics, particularly when several of them are 
concentrated under certain circumstances thereby having a deleterious effect 
upon the adjacent areas.”117 But rather than regulating the operational 
characteristics of such establishments directly, the Detroit Common Council 
passed, and the Supreme Court upheld, the zoning regulations that limited 
the permitted locations for the establishments themselves on the basis of the 
types of films they exhibited. One important piece of the precedent from 
Young is the Court’s firm refusal to second-guess the Common Council’s 
motives or the strength of the evidence justifying the sweeping regulation: 
 
It is not our function to appraise the wisdom of its decision to 
require adult theaters to be separated rather than concentrated in 
the same areas. In either event, the city’s interest in attempting to 
preserve the quality of urban life is one that must be accorded high 
respect.118 
 
The Court generally passed on the opportunity to discuss the weight 
of the evidentiary or technology policy arguments at issue in the landmark 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation case, opting instead to defer to the FCC’s own 
 
113 See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). 
114 See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).  
115 See, e.g., Merrill v. People First of Alabama 141 S. Ct. 190 (2020).  
116 Young, 427 U.S. at 82 (Powell, J., concurring). 
117 Id. at 54 (citing Ord. No. 11-05, § 1(66.000)). 
118 Id. at 71. 
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findings regarding the threats posed by sexually explicit media on broadcast 
and its determination that the Carlin monologue was legally indecent.119 
Conceptually at least, the Court took for granted the FCC’s position that 
broadcast technologies presented unique threats by exposing unwitting 
listeners, especially minors, to objectionable material.120 We do not quibble 
with the Court’s sensible determination that broadcast technology is a unique 
medium and that its technological characteristics should have some bearing 
on how courts analyze the context and circumstances surrounding potentially 
offensive broadcasts, but the Court’s commitment to evidentiary deference 
is noteworthy. The issue of evidentiary deference that characterized Young 
and Pacifica truly came to a head in United States v. Playboy, which 
involved considerable dispute over the level of evidence required to justify 
a sweeping federal regulation on sexually explicit speech. 
 The evidentiary conundrum discussed here presents a core question: what is 
the nature and extent of evidence required to sustain a restriction on protected 
sexually explicit speech? Young suggests that in secondary effects cases, 
restrictions on an entire class of speakers or content could be justifiable on 
the basis of some reasonable modicum of evidence, a minimal standard121. 
But in United States v. Playboy, the Court appeared open to a heightened 
evidentiary requirement that calls for probative evidence that the harms the 
government cites are real and likely to be experienced by a substantial 
proportion of the population the government seeks to protect.122  
 As discussed above, Congress passed Section 505 of the 
Telecommunications Act to address “signal bleed,” the problem of sexually 
explicit images creeping over from adult cable channels into channels 
intended for general audiences.123 Although the categorization and 
interpretative conundrums puzzled the Court, one of the most significant 
disputes among the Supreme Court justices, in dialogue with Congress and 
the lower courts, involved the evidence presented by the government that 
signal bleed was a serious problem capable of being addressed by legislative 
restrictions on cable operators. As summarized by the three-judge panel 
sitting in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, the 
government relied primarily on purportedly compelling anecdotal evidence 
of bleeding signals affecting unsuspecting and sensitive customers who did 
not want to receive Playboy’s cable content.124  
Unlike its approach in Young or Pacifica, the Supreme Court 
explicitly questioned the paucity of empirical evidence justifying the signal 
 
119 Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 760 (Powell, J., concurring). 
120 Id. at 748-50.  
121 See Young, 427 U.S. at 71. 
122 See Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. at  821-22. 
123 Id. at 806. 
124 Id. at 819. 
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bleed provision in Section 505. Although Congress possessed evidence that 
nearly 39 million homes with approximately 29.5 million children might be 
exposed to signal bleed, the evidence did not show the significance of the 
harmful effects as they would be experienced in real-life households. The 
Court questioned whether the regulation met the strict scrutiny standard, 
which requires showing that the regulation is necessary to achieve a 
compelling government interest. 125There was some evidence that the 
potential for harm was broad, but no indication in the majority’s eyes that 
the harm was qualitatively significant. Specifically, the Court pointed out 
that there was “no probative evidence in the record which differentiates 
among the extent of bleed at individual households and no evidence which 
otherwise quantifies the signal bleed problem.”126 “Without some sort of 
field survey,” Justice Anthony Kennedy wrote, on behalf of the majority, “it 
is impossible to know how widespread the problem in fact is, and the only 
indicator in the record is a handful of complaints.”127 Despite the dissent’s 
plea to grant regulators more empirical leeway,128 Playboy demonstrates that 
over time, the judicial deference at the core of Young and Pacifica had 
perhaps given way to healthy scientific skepticism as new methods of private 
content delivery, such as cable and internet, became available in homes. 
However, the Court’s apparent willingness in Playboy to engage in 
scientific dialogue does not resolve the evidentiary conundrum. In City of 
Erie v. Pap’s A.M., the justices struggled with core scientific issues of 
external validity and generalizability.129 In passing its public nudity ban that 
ultimately targeted adult clubs, the City of Erie relied on evidence of adult 
establishments’ harmful secondary effects.130 The problem with the 
evidentiary record in City of Erie is that it consisted entirely of evidence 
introduced in the Supreme Court’s earlier cases in Young v. American Mini 
Theatres and City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres. Over Pap’s A.M.’s 
counsel’s objections, the Court endorsed this approach:  
 
And in terms of demonstrating that such secondary effects pose a 
threat, the city need not “conduct new studies or produce evidence 
independent of that already generated by other cities” to 
demonstrate the problem of secondary effects, so long as whatever 
evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant 
to the problem that the city addresses.131 
 
125 Id. at 815. 
126 Id. at 820-21.  
127 Id.  
128 Id. at 841.  
129 See City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277. 
130 Id. at 291. 
131 Id. at 313 (internal citations omitted). 
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The City of Erie apparently relied on its own “findings” to support its 
regulation of adult business, although the Court only cited the preamble of 
the ordinance at issue in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., and not the evidence 
itself:  
 
[T]he Council of the City of Erie has, at various times over more 
than a century, expressed its findings that certain lewd, immoral 
activities carried on in public places for profit are highly 
detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare, and lead to the 
debasement of both women and men, promote violence, public 
intoxication, prostitution and other serious criminal activity.132 
 
Reasonable belief should not carry the day in matters that can be investigated 
by rigorous social science, especially in legal terrain that requires 
intermediate, if not heightened strict, scrutiny. Likewise, government 
regulations that rely merely on vague conceptualizations of harm (i.e. 
“debasement of both women and men”) must fail if they do no more than 
assert a social harm without substantial empirical support.  
The Court’s preference for deference in cases involving small adult 
businesses but interest in field surveys investigating harms caused by 
massive private cable operators lacks logical soundness necessary to form 
coherent doctrine. However, of the three conundrums highlighted here, the 
evidentiary conundrum is the one most amenable to resolution, provided that 
the Court is willing to follow its own recent rulings and applications of 
heightened scrutiny where certain speakers or content are singled out for 
disparate treatment by lawmakers.133 The sexually explicit speech cases have 
attracted a cadre of amici curiae, demonstrating heightened interest in 
appealing to the Court’s considerations of social science and empirical 
evidence through appellate advocacy. It is in this robust amicus strategy that 
the Court might find help in resolving an otherwise hopelessly contradictory 
set of doctrines that limit discourses on sex. 
 
The emergence of amicus strategy in sexually explicit speech cases 
 
For each of the cases analyzed here, a wide variety of organizations 
(from legal scholars to nudist groups) submitted amicus briefs for the Court 
to consider the groups’ insights on the law of sexually explicit speech and 
the implications of the docketed cases. As previously discussed, in the earlier 
cases of Young and Pacifica, the Court deferred to the regulatory bodies and 
 
132 Id. at 297. 
133 Reed, 576 U.S. 155. 
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their claims without contending with the evidence of purportedly harmful 
effects of sexually explicit speech. But in Playboy and City of Erie, the Court 
drew significant attention to the scientific evidence for its decisions, which 
may be the result, in part, of the submitted amicus briefs. 
The subject of harm resulting from signal bleed (an empirical 
question), was at the core of United States v. Playboy and the government’s 
proposed regulatory scheme for sexually explicit adult cable channels.134 
Submitted to the Court were a series of amicus briefs, but two—of opposing 
positions—focus on the evidence of these harms. The first, submitted by a 
collection of “sexuality scholars, researchers, educators, and therapists,” 
argues that there is no scientific evidence of psychological harms 
experienced by signal bleed.135 Citing to a collection of health experts, the 
group called on the Court to disregard the government’s claims of harms and 
to find no compelling governmental interest in shielding minors from 
“sexually explicit” or “indecent” signal bleed.136 Conversely, a collection of 
family and morality groups submitted to the Court a brief with research 
arguing that such signal bleed was, indeed, dangerous because even the 
slightest exposure encourages children to access sexually explicit speech, a 
“detriment” to children’s sexual development,137 thus regulation to stem 
signal bleed is necessary and justified. The Court did not acknowledge or 
cite to either of these briefs in its opinion, but the debate and role of empirical 
evidence weighed heavily in the Court’s decision in Playboy, which 
ultimately concluded that the scientific record was insufficient to justify the 
sweeping regulation on signal bleed.  
Debate over empirical evidence again manifested in City of Erie v. 
Pap’s A.M. when the Court considered the constitutionality of a total ban on 
public nudity aimed at stemming harmful secondary effects of nude dancing 
on community property values and crime rates.138 Particularly compelling in 
the opinion was an amicus brief submitted by the First Amendment Lawyers 
Association which provided extensive research on the impact—or lack 
thereof—of nude dancing entertainment. The Association’s brief argued that 
three of the four secondary effects studies cited by the City of Erie were 
scientifically invalid.139 Specifically, the three challenged studies were not 
reliable because they failed at least one of the following checks for scientific 
validity: a well-matched control city, sufficient time for study measurement, 
 
134 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
135 Brief for Sexuality Scholars et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellee, United 
States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (2000).  
136 Id.  
137 Brief for Family Research Council et. al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 
9, United States v. Playboy Ent. Grp., 529 U.S. 803 (2000) (No. 98-1682). 
138 City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277. 
139 Brief for The First Amendment Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (No. 98-1161). 
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a valid measure for “crime,” and the correct survey method/research tool.140 
The secondary effects study conducted in Indianapolis, Indiana, for example, 
failed three of the four points of scientific validity.141 Furthermore, the one 
study that did pass scientific muster, conducted in St. Paul, Minnesota, in 
1978, found no negative secondary effects associated with adult 
entertainment establishments.142 Despite this extensive evidence provided by 
the Association that disproves the government’s claims of negative 
secondary effects and nude entertainment, the Court states in its opinion that 
“the study relied on by amicus curiae does not cast any legitimate doubt on 
the Erie city council’s judgment about Erie.”143 The Court gave no additional 
explanation for why it found the Association’s research insufficient. This 
decision by the plurality, however, is a source of fracture in the opinion. 
In his dissent, Justice David Souter criticized the plurality’s opinion 
on the government’s evidence of secondary effects and demanded a greater 
evidentiary basis for the nude ban (something he acknowledges he failed to 
do in his concurrence in Barnes v. Glen Theatre144). The plurality states that 
the preamble of Erie’s nudity ordinance—which states vaguely of “findings” 
of detrimental secondary effects from adult entertainment businesses—is 
sufficient evidence to support Erie’s regulation.145 But in Justice Souter’s 
view, the plurality “seeks to ratchet up the value of mere conclusions by 
analogizing them to the legislative facts within an administrative agency’s 
special knowledge, on which action is adequately premised in the absence of 
evidentiary challenge.”146 Further, Justice Souter contends that this 
“evidence” as cited by the plurality is insufficient in the presence of real fact. 
Citing to the research provided by the Association, Justice Souter states, “it 
is one thing to accord administrative leeway as to predictive judgments in 
applying “ ‘elusive concepts’ ” to circumstances where the record is 
inconclusive and “evidence ... is difficult to compile,” and quite another to 
dispense with evidence of current fact as a predicate for banning a 
subcategory of expression.”147 According to Justice Souter, not only did the 
City of Erie fail to demonstrate the nudity ban will mitigate the secondary 
effects but there lacks sufficient evidence that such harms even exist, 
particularly in light of research that empirically reports the opposite.  
 
140 Id. 
141 Brief for The First Amendment Lawyers Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at Table 2, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000) (No. 98-1161). 
142 Id. 
143 City of Erie, 529 U.S. at 298.  
144 Id. at 315 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); See Barnes, 501 
U.S. 560.  
145 Id. at 298 (majority opinion).  
146 Id. at 314 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
147 Id. at 314-15. 
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The fracture of opinion over the science and evidence in City of Erie 
v. Pap’s A.M. best demonstrates the evidentiary conundrum affecting the 
Supreme Court’s ability to determine the nature and extent of evidence 
required to sustain a restriction on protected sexually explicit speech. 
Playboy and Pap’s A.M. indicate the Court’s willingness to engage in 
scientific dialogue, but the Court has not settled on a legal standard for 
sufficient and substantive evidence in sexually explicit speech cases. This 
lack of cohesion, however, may be remedied using expert knowledge, like 
the kind found in the submitted amicus briefs.  
Earlier, we acknowledged that the Supreme Court is not, at least 
explicitly, a factfinding body. Especially in the post-digital era, a time when 
data is constantly gathered and peer-reviewed research is readily accessible, 
ample expertise is available to assist the Court in evaluating evidentiary 
claims. As made evident by the amicus briefs submitted for Playboy and 
Pap’s A.M., there are interested and qualified parties from which the Court 
can glean knowledge and better inform its decisions. The challenge, 
however, is establishing a clear substantiation standard. Without clear and 
uniform agreement from the Court on the level of evidence required, a 
strategy for relying on knowledge submitted by friends of the courts will be 
fruitless.  
 
RECOMMENDATIONS & CONCLUSION 
 
THREE CONUNDRUMS – TWO DISASTERS AND SOME HOPE 
 
In unpacking the Supreme Court’s decisions and justifications for 
assigning sexually explicit speech a low-value categorization, this study 
revealed three conundrums within the sexually explicit speech case law: the 
categorical, the interpretative, and the evidentiary. The Court has created 
fractured doctrine, often around their resolutions to these conundrums. 
Undoubtedly, the law on sexually explicit speech needs reformation.  
Based on the findings from this analysis, we recommend that, in 
future cases, the Supreme Court abandon its approaches related to the 
categorization or interpretations of sexually explicit speech and its 
regulations. It was arguably a noble endeavor by the Court to try to link these 
cases using categorization or interpretation, but when faced with the 
variability and subjectivity of these cases (ranging from dirty words to dirty 
dancing), disaster was likely inevitable. As demonstrated in the analysis, 
these practices lead to glaring inconsistencies and fail to unify protections 
and regulations of sexually explicit speech. Thus, the Court should dispense 
with using these practices in future cases of sexually explicit speech and its 
regulations.  
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But, to paraphrase the Court, let us not burn down the house to roast 
the pig,148 as the evidentiary conundrum is not without remedy. Although 
this study revealed the Court has been unclear and inconsistent on the nature 
and extent of evidence required to sustain a restriction on protected sexually 
explicit speech, leaving it with no clear direction, a workable substantiation 
standard could resolve the evidentiary conundrum. This section describes the 
proposed standard and applies its key components to the evidentiary 
problems presented by secondary effects cases. 
 
First Amendment scrutiny and substantiation in sexually explicit speech 
cases  
 
The Supreme Court has long engaged with the conceptual and 
practical challenges of analyzing legislative attempts to regulate speech in 
the realm of vice. Like speech related to lawful commercial products such as 
alcohol149 or tobacco,150 or services such as gambling,151 sexually explicit 
speech has frequently drawn interest from legislatures aiming to curb speech 
for the purposes of promoting public health and morality.152 We assume as 
the Court has, that sexually explicit speech involves a cognizable erotic 
message,153 with some modicum of value that brings it within the First 
Amendment’s protective reach. Like regulations aimed at valuable 
commercial speech associated with potentially harmful vice products, a 
workable doctrine of sexually explicit speech must include doctrinal 
elements that balance the value of erotic messages against their purported 
harms in a manner that satisfies at least intermediate scrutiny. The 
commercial speech doctrine and the progeny of the landmark case Central 
Hudson Gas & Elec. v. New York Pub. Serv. Comm’n provide the appropriate 
framework for balancing the legislative preferences of local governments 
with the First Amendment rights of adult content purveyors. It does so by 
injecting into the First Amendment analysis a substantiation requirement by 
which regulators must demonstrate a minimum level of efficacy for a 
regulation to survive First Amendment scrutiny.  
Following a conservative realignment of the Supreme Court in the 
1980s, commercial speech jurisprudence has undergone seemingly rapid 
reformation favoring a fairly exacting, protective standard for commercial 
 
148 Butler v. State of Mich., 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957) (stating “The State insists that, 
by thus quarantining the general reading public against books not too rugged for grown men 
and women in order to shield juvenile innocence, it is exercising its power to promote the 
general welfare. Surely, this is to burn the house to roast the pig.”). 
149 See Rubin v. Coors, 514 U.S. 476 (1995). 
150 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). 
151 Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc., Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999). 
152 See City of Erie, 529 U.S. 277.  
153 Id. at 278-79; see also Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571. 
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speech, beginning in Central Hudson and ripening in Sorrell v. IMS Health. 
In Central Hudson, the Court fashioned a conjunctive, four-pronged test that 
a regulation of commercial speech must meet in order to survive intermediate 
constitutional scrutiny: 
 
[First], we must determine whether the expression is protected by 
the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that 
provision, it at least must concern a lawful activity and not be 
misleading. [Second], we ask whether the asserted governmental 
interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive answers, we 
must [third] determine whether the regulation directly advances 
the governmental interest asserted, and [fourth] whether it is not 
more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.154 
 
Insofar as governments seek to regulate lawful commercial speech with an 
eye toward ameliorating public health concerns, such as binge drinking155 or 
underage smoking,156 the first two prongs represent a minimal hurdle for 
legislatures. Central Hudson and its progeny find their teeth in an 
increasingly strict third prong, which requires lawmakers to prove that a 
regulation on protected commercial speech directly and materially advances 
the government’s stated regulatory interest.157  
At its heart, the third prong calls for empirical measures of 
regulatory efficacy. In 1993, the Supreme Court applied Central Hudson in 
Edenfield v. Fane to a Florida regulation that prohibited certified public 
accounts from “direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation” of clients.158 The 
Florida Board of Accountancy argued that the non-solicitation rule was 
necessary to preserve the independent judgment of CPAs who often attest to 
the accuracy of audited financial statements.159 After easily finding that the 
regulation satisfied the first two prongs of Central Hudson, the Court struck 
down the non-solicitation regulation on the grounds that the State of Florida 
 
154 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980). 
155 See 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 490 (1996). 
156 See Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. at 533-34. 
157 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 661-62 (1994) (citing Ward v. 
Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989)). For the test of regulations of commercial 
speech, see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. 447 U.S. at 566 (“At the outset, we must 
determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial 
speech to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be 
misleading. Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both 
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances 
the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to 
serve that interest.”). 
158 Edenfield v. Fane, 501 U.S. 761, 763 (1993). 
159 Id. at 764. 
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had failed to introduce sufficient studies or even anecdotal evidence that the 
non-solicitation rule directly and materially advanced its interest in 
preventing conflicts of interest in the accounting profession.160 Building on 
the existing commercial speech standard, the Court emphasized that the 
direct-and-material-advancement burden “is not satisfied by mere 
speculation or conjecture; rather, a governmental body seeking to sustain a 
restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that the harms it recites 
are real and that its restriction will in fact alleviate them to a material 
degree.”161  
Edenfield strengthened the Central Hudson standard considerably 
and also set forth a doctrinal framework for ascertaining the type, quantity, 
and character of evidence necessary to support a restriction on protected 
commercial speech.162 Only two years later, in Florida Bar v. Went For It, 
Inc., the Court upheld a restriction that prohibited attorneys from sending 
direct-mail advertising to accident victims (read: potential clients) within 
thirty days of a motor vehicle accident.163 Assessing the evidentiary support 
for the restriction, the Court found that the State of Florida met the Edenfield 
substantiation standard by producing two methodologically sound empirical 
studies independently commissioned by the State of Florida that showed that 
a substantial percentage of respondents thought that direct-mail attorney 
advertising violated victim privacy or undermined public perception of the 
judicial system or the attorney profession.164  
Failing to meet the evidentiary requirements, the Court struck down 
a host of commercial speech restrictions in the years that followed Went For 
It, many of which were assertedly rooted in legislative interests in public 
health issues. The Edenfield substantiation standard proved pivotal as the 
Court explored the contours of the commercial speech doctrine and the third 
prong of Central Hudson. For example, the Court dashed a federal ban on 
broadcast advertisements for casino gambling finding scant causal links 
between advertising and compulsive gambling.165 Similarly, the Court struck 
 
160 Id. at 771. 
161 Id. at 770-71. 
162 R. Michael Hoefges, Regulating Professional Services Advertising: Current 
Constitutional Parameters and Issues under the First Amendment Commercial Speech 
Doctrine, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 953, 983 (2007). 
163 See Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995). 
164 Id. at 625-27. 
165 Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc., Inc., 527 U.S. at 189 (“Assuming the accuracy 
of this causal chain, it does not necessarily follow that the Government’s speech ban has 
directly and materially furthered the asserted interest. While it is no doubt fair to assume that 
more advertising would have some impact on overall demand for gambling, it is also 
reasonable to assume that much of that advertising would merely channel gamblers to one 
casino rather than another. More important, any measure of the effectiveness of the 
Government’s attempt to minimize the social costs of gambling cannot ignore Congress’ 
simultaneous encouragement of tribal casino gambling, which may well be growing at a rate 
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down a federal ban on advertising the strength (measured by alcohol-by-
volume) of certain alcoholic beverages citing both conjectural purported 
harm and a lack of regulatory efficacy.166 And in 2001, the Court handed a 
major victory to Lorillard Tobacco Company after the cigarette manufacturer 
challenged a series of regulations aimed at curbing underage smoking, one 
of which required point-of-sale advertising for tobacco products to be placed 
more than five feet off the ground, supposedly to limit youth exposure to 
tobacco ads.167 The so-called five-foot rule failed Central Hudson analysis 
in part because it provided “only ineffective or remote support for the 
government’s purpose.”168  
The Supreme Court put a final punctuation mark in the evolution of 
the Central Hudson standard in the 2011 case Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 
which involved a Vermont ban on a marketing practice known as 
pharmaceutical detailing in which drug manufacturers use prescribing 
information to target market pharmaceutical drugs to physicians.169 In 
striking down the ban, the Court seemingly strengthened the commercial 
speech doctrine further when held that the ban aimed at pharmaceutical 
marketers amounted to a speaker-based ban subject to “heightened judicial 
scrutiny.”170 
The Central Hudson standard’s evolution has been fueled by 
governmental attempts to regulate either speech about purportedly harmful 
products or purportedly harmful modes of commercial speech and marketing 
activity. These concerns closely parallel the public health concerns raised in 
many of the cases discussed above involving sexually explicit speech. Yet in 
the commercial context, the Court has cautioned, “The First Amendment 
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people 
in the dark for what the government perceives to be their own good.”171 The 
Court has also reminded us that market participants ought to have some say 
in the value of commercial speech:  
 
The commercial marketplace, like other spheres of our social and 
cultural life, provides a forum where ideas and information 
flourish. Some of the ideas and information are vital, some of 
slight worth. But the general rule is that the speaker and the 
 
exceeding any increase in gambling or compulsive gambling that private casino advertising 
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audience, not the government, assess the value of the information 
presented.172 
 
Many of the landmark attempts to regulate sexually explicit speech have 
called for the Court to consider the constitutionality of such regulations 
against the backdrop of society’s interest in sexual expression and its 
corresponding social value. But this is the wrong question entirely. For one, 
it treats society as a monolith. Additionally, it downplays the role that 
empirical social science can play in describing causal relationships between 
speech, harm, and social value. On the evidentiary question, there is no 
principled reason to treat the consumption of sexually explicit speech in 
quasi-private spaces by consenting adults any different than allegedly 
harmful speech practices borne out of a purely commercial context, 
particularly when governments have the ability to amass an evidentiary 
record of the purported harms and the effectiveness of their regulatory 
proposals.  
 The proper inquiry for the Court to undertake is a two-fold analysis 
of the government’s rationale for restricting sexually explicit speech on the 
basis of a purported harm and the supporting evidence proffered by the 
government: First, the Court must determine whether the government has 
articulated a sufficiently important interest in regulating protected sexually 
explicit speech; Second, the Court must determine the efficacy of the 
challenged regulation such that the law reasonably fits the interest in a 
manner that is neither overbroad nor unduly burdensome. To sustain a 
regulation aimed at protected sexually explicit expression, the government 
should have to prove that the harms it recites are real and that the regulation 
to alleviate those harms to a material degree without relying merely on 
speculation or conjecture.173 By adopting this approach, the Court would 
incentivize the introduction of competent and reliable scientific evidence to 
support what are ultimately empirical claims about the effects of sexually 
explicit speech.  
The proposals articulated above give courts ample alternative 
choices for meaningful doctrinal reformation. At maximum, they invite the 
Court to interpret direct burdens on purveyors of sexually explicit speech for 
the content-based restrictions that they are. Given the judiciary’s collective 
approval of the low-value approach, however, such a sea change is unlikely. 
At minimum, then, the Court ought to consider the more modest proposal of 
engrafting a substantiation requirement onto the test of intermediate scrutiny 
it frequently uses to resolve constitutional challenges to regulations that 
target sexually explicit speech in private domains or quasi-private places of 
public accommodation. 
 
172 Edenfield, 501 U.S. at 767. 
173 See, e.g., Greater New Orleans Broad. Assoc., Inc., 527 U.S. 173. 
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Fortunately, this standard is readily adaptable either wholesale from 
the commercial speech doctrine or piecemeal from the sexually explicit 
speech cases analyzed and discussed in this article. The shift toward a 
doctrine grounded in empirical reality is already present in the case law, 
albeit among either a soft majority or a cadre of dissenting justices through 
the decades. The majority opinion in United States v. Playboy and Justice 
Souter’s dissent in City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. demonstrate that over time, the 
judicial deference at the core of Young v. American Mini Theaters and F.C.C. 
v. Pacifica Foundation has perhaps given way to healthy scientific 
skepticism. Furthermore, reference by the Court to scientific research 
provided by the represented parties and in amicus briefs in Playboy and 
Pap’s A.M., respectively, suggest a willingness by the Court to not only 
require substantive evidence but also to consider knowledge and expertise 
outside of the law. To that end, a substantiation standard requiring empirical, 
evidentiary support is achievable now, more than ever, because of the 
modern availability of scientific evidence and useful data.  
At the time Young and Pacifica were decided, an empirical efficacy 
standard would have represented an almost insurmountable, albeit 
constitutionally consistent, burden. Requiring lawmakers to empirically link 
pornography to real social harms and then convincingly argue that a 
regulation could alleviate those harms to a material degree might have 
proven a bridge too far. But today, particularly for regulations targeting the 
purportedly harmful effects of sexually explicit speech, there is no reason for 
the Court to not require heightened substantiation given an abundance of 
scientifically valid, empirical research available from a variety of fields, 
including media effects,174 psychology,175 public health,176 and public 
opinion.177 To that point, if and when the Court is asked to consider new or 
additional regulation of sexually explicit speech, the Court will find ample 
research that suggests U.S. citizens strongly support the freedoms of sexually 
explicit speech178 and heightened social acceptance of sexually explicit 
 
174 E.g., Brian J. Willoughby et al., Associations between Relational Sexual Behaviour, 
Pornography Use, and Pornography Acceptance among U.S. College Students, 16 CULTURE, 
HEALTH & SEXUALITY 1052 (2014).  
175 E.g., John B. Franks, The Evaluation of Community Standards, 139 J. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 253 (1999). 
176 E.g., Cameron C. Brown et al., A Common-Fate Analysis of Pornography 
Acceptance, Age, and Sexual Satisfaction among Heterosexual Married Couples, 46 
ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 575 (2017). 
177 E.g., Richard Wike & Katie Simmons, Global Support for Principle of Free 
Expression, but Opposition to Some Forms of Speech, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Nov. 18, 
2015), http://www.pewglobal.org/2015/11/18/global-support-for-principle-of-free-
expression-but-opposition-to-some-forms-of-speech. 
178 See HADLEY CANTRIL & MILDRED STRUNK, PUBLIC OPINION 1935-1946 244 (1951) 
(discussing public opinion research on U.S. citizens’ attitudes toward free speech dating back 
to the 1930s). See also Julie L. Andsager, A Constant Tension: Public Support for Free 
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speech,179 all while supporting regulations like limiting access for 
adolescents and minors.180 In this regulatory environment, state and local 
governments are suitable laboratories for experimenting with regulations 
that balance public health concerns with First Amendment protections. But 
regulatory schemes, like all good experiments, should be scrutinized for 
reliability, validity, and the overall presence or absence of empirical support. 
Courts are equipped to make these empirical judgments, but they currently 
lack the doctrinal mechanisms for assessing the efficacy of strong 
regulations on protected sexual expression. 
Currently, the conundrums created by the Court’s convoluted 
sexually explicit speech cases leave the entire doctrine weak, insufficient, 
and outdated. Therefore, we recommend that the Court abrogate its previous 
decisions that categorized sexually explicit speech as categorically low-
value. We urge the Court to categorize restrictions on sexually explicit 
speech as content-based and therefore worthy of strict constitutional 
scrutiny. But absent that significant doctrinal turn, we recommend adopting 
and implementing a substantiation standard for restrictions on sexually 
explicit speech that mirrors the commercial speech doctrine’s efficacy 
requirements. These recommendations will realign the fractured doctrine of 
sexually explicit speech and will create a clearer decision-making framework 
that balances the valuable interests in sexually explicit speech against its 





Expression, 38 STAN. J. INT’L L. 3, 7 (2002) (identifying additional research on specific types 
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179 See supra notes 161-165 and accompanying text.  
180 E.g., Albert C. Gunther, Overrating the X-rating: The Third-Person Perception and 
Support for Censorship of Pornography, 45 J. COMM. 27 (1995). Jennifer L. Lambe, Who 
Wants to Censor Pornography and Hate Speech?, 7 MASS COMM. & SOC. 279 (2004). 
